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Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks  
and Firm Reputation 
 
Luisa Menapace and GianCarlo Moschini 
 
Abstract 
We study firm reputation as a mechanism to assure product quality in perfectly competitive markets 
in a context in which both certification and trademarks are available. Shapiro’s (1983) model of 
reputation is extended to reflect both collective and firm-specific reputations, and this framework is 
used to study certification and trademarks for food products with a regional identity, known as 
geographical  indications  (GIs).  Our  model  yields  two  primary  results.  First,  in  markets  with 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems, credible certification schemes reduce the cost 
of establishing reputation and lead to welfare gains compared to a situation in which only private 
trademarks are  available.  Hence,  certification  improves  the  ability  of reputation  to operate as  a 
mechanism  for  assuring  quality.  Second,  the  actual  design  of  the  certification  scheme  plays  an 
important role in mitigating informational problems. From a policy perspective, our results have 
implications for the current debate and negotiations on GIs at the World Trade Organization and 
the  ongoing  product  quality  policy  reform  within  the  European  Union.  With  regard  to  the 
instrument of choice to provide intellectual property protection for GIs, our model favors a sui 
generis scheme based on appellations over certification marks. Finally, our model supports the validity 
of the traditional specialities guaranteed scheme of the European Union as an instrument for the 
provision of high-quality products that are not linked to a geographic area.  
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1.  Introduction 
The strand of literature sparked by the pioneering work of Shapiro (1983) on the role of firm 
reputation offers a possible solution to the market failure identified by Akerlof (1970) in settings 
characterized  by  asymmetric  information  and  moral  hazard  problems.  When  firms  identify 
themselves to consumers through trademarks, product quality can be credibly signaled to consumers 
who cannot observe it at the time of purchase. The emergence of this information about quality is 
achieved in competitive markets through an equilibrium price structure that provides the necessary 
incentives for competitive firms to develop and maintain reputation for producing a given quality. 
This literature also shows that reputation is an imperfect mechanism to assure quality and that high-
quality items can only be provided at a premium above production costs. The size of the premium 
increases with the degree of the informational problem, which, in turn, depends upon the frequency 
of purchase, the delay and difficulty in detecting quality and the speed at which reputations are 
updated. More importantly for our purpose, the extent of the informational problem can be affected 
by the availability of tools for reputation building (e.g., trademarks, certification). 
In this paper we extend the theory of firm reputation as a mechanism to assure quality in 
competitive markets to a context in which both certification and trademarks are available to firms as 
quality  indicators.  The  primary  motivation  of  this  paper  is  to  show  that,  in  such  markets  with 
asymmetric  product  quality  information,  credible  certification  schemes  that  are  accessible  by all 
firms or subsets of the firm population support the creation of information regarding quality, reduce 
the  cost  of  establishing  reputation  and  lead  to  welfare  gains.  The  reputation  approach  to  the 
problem of moral hazard also draws attention to the fact that the design of certification schemes is 
important  in determining  the extent  of informational  problems  and  the  distribution  of  benefits 
among heterogeneous consumers. 
For concreteness, our model is specifically tailored to markets for food products with a 
regional identity. For these products, the geographic names of the location of production, known as 
geographical indications (GIs), represent an option for branding. GIs, like trademarks, are a form of 
intellectual property rights, and were introduced in 1994 with the TRIPS agreement of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The markets for GIs are befitting for several reasons. First, given the 
abundance  and  importance  of  experience  and  credence  attributes  among  food  products,  these 
markets  are  fraught  with  asymmetric  information  and  moral  hazard  problems  (Winfree  and 
McCluskey 2005). Second, these markets are typically characterized by the presence of numerous 
autonomous firms that make independent business decisions and retain their own profits, but share 3 
 
a geographic brand and act in competitive conditions (Fishman et al. 2008; Moschini, Menapace and 
Pick 2008). Third, the use of formal certifications for this category of products is common in many 
large export markets including the European Union (EU) and growing in popularity in emerging 
markets  and  developing  economies  (EU  2008;  WIPO  2007).  Fourth,  the  concurrent  use  of 
certification and trademarks for branding these products is also common (Bramley and Kirsten 
2007).  
GIs  have  recently  attracted  the  interest  of  academics  in  economics,  marketing,  law  and 
sociology. In particular, a growing economics literature has assessed the role of GIs as a certification 
tool  in  alleviating  market  failures  due  to  the  presence  of  asymmetric  information  when  quality 
cannot be credibly signaled otherwise (Zago and Pick 2004; Anania and Nisticó 2004; Lence et al. 
2007; Moschini, Menapace and Pick 2008). In this paper, we assess the role of GIs when quality can 
alternatively be sustained through trademarks, and consider GIs and trademarks as alternative and 
complementary means for signaling quality. We expand the existing literature on GIs in several ways. 
First, we explicitly incorporate the role of reputation and hence consider a dynamic rather than a 
static setting. Critically, we shift the focus from considering a generic certification scheme for GIs 
that allows for the emergence of a high-quality market in which a single product is considered in 
isolation, to the design of a certification scheme that applies to a broadly defined type of product 
available under many different private and collective brands and potentially supplied from many 
different GI regions.  
The model we propose in this paper relies on Shapiro’s (1983) notion of reputation, which 
we  extend  to  reflect  both  collective  and  firm-specific  reputations  in  competitive  markets. 
Specifically, an initial investment via the production of high-quality product is necessary for a firm to 
gain private reputation. Collective reputation is obtained through certification and is determined by 
the conditions required for certification (e.g., minimum quality, production technology, etc.). In 
equilibrium, quality in excess of the minimum commands a premium above marginal costs, which, as 
in  Shapiro,  represents  a  fair  return  on  the  private  investment  in  reputation.  In  this  setting, 
certification reduces the cost of building reputation by constraining the moral hazard behavior of 
producers. 
Our model can differentiate the two primary certification schemes currently used for GIs, 
the European-style sui generis scheme based on appellations and the American-style scheme based on 
certification marks, and allows us to investigate the potential of the EU’s traditional specialities 
guaranteed scheme (EU 2009a). These schemes differ substantially with regard to (i) the eligibility 4 
 
conditions  for  geographic  names  to  receive  intellectual  property  (IP)  protection  and  (ii)  the 
requirements  for  certification.  In  a  second-best  world  with  asymmetric  information,  these 
differences are relevant because they affect the collective reputation of certified products and hence 
the cost of providing quality.  
Several instructive aspects of the role of certification in quality provision and reputation 
formation emerge from the model. First, we show that certification reduces the divergence between 
the reputation equilibrium and the equilibrium that would prevail under perfect information by 
lowering the cost of establishing reputation compared to a situation with only trademarks. Hence, 
certification  improves  the  ability  of  reputation  to  operate  as  a  mechanism  for  assuring  quality. 
Second,  we  provide  a  motivation  for  industry  resistance  to  the  introduction  of  certification. 
Surprisingly we find that resistance from producers is not limited to those that are excluded from the 
certification but can also arise from those producers that are eligible for certification but already sell 
high-quality product when certification is introduced. This is because certification raises the price 
that  entrants  can  command  thereby  reducing  the  cost  of  building  and  the  value  of  established 
reputation. 
In addition, our model has interesting implications for the current debate and negotiations 
over alternative forms of IP protection for GIs at the WTO and the ongoing consultations on 
product quality policy reform within the European Union. First, we provide a rationale to favor a sui 
generis scheme based on appellations over standard instruments such as certification marks. We show 
that this is the case even if the current certification mark system were to be adapted to include a 
screening based on the presence of a demonstrable quality/geography nexus similar to that used for 
appellations. Second, our model discusses the potential welfare gains associated with the traditional 
specialities  guaranteed scheme,  a  scheme  for  traditional  products  used  in  the  European  Union, 
whose validity is currently being assessed by the EU Commission (EU 2009b). Such a scheme, based 
exclusively on quality (rather than on geographical) requirements, provides certification for products 
that meet given quality standards independently of the location of production. 
In  what follows,  we  first  provide  a  review  of  the institutional setting  for  GIs  and  then 
introduce the model and the reputation formation mechanism. Next, we define and derive a long-
run,  rational-expectation,  stationary  Nash  equilibrium  under  three  different  IP  scenarios 
characterized by (i) the absence of a certification scheme, (ii) the presence of a sui generis certification 
scheme and (iii) the presence of a certification mark scheme. In the last part of the paper, we discuss 
domestic and trade welfare implications and explore the traditional specialities guaranteed scheme. 5 
 
2.  Institutional Framework 
Geographical indications, which are typically names of places or regions used to brand goods, are a 
distinct form of intellectual property rights. Many GIs pertain to wines (e.g., Burgundy), agricultural 
products (e.g., Thai Hom Mali rice) and foods (e.g., Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese), but also non-food 
products (e.g., handicrafts and textiles) are common, particularly from developing countries (e.g., 
Mysore silk).
1 The distinctive feature of GIs is that the quality attributes of the goods they identify 
are considered to be inherently linked to the nature of the geographic location in which production 
takes  place  (e.g.,  climate  conditions,  soil  composition,  local  knowledge),  i.e.,  to  the  notion  of 
“terroir” (Barham 2003; Josling 2006).
2 
GIs  are  considered  one  of  the  earliest  instruments  used  to  counteract  market  failures 
resulting from asymmetric information (Rangnekar 2004) and their protection has a long tradition in 
Europe  dating  back  to  the  fifteenth  century  (O’Connor  2004).  However,  following  the  EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy reform in 1992, which moved EU policies progressively away from 
price supports towards programs to promote food quality and rural development, GIs have taken 
center stage as the “main pillar of the EU’s quality policy on agricultural products” (EU 2003). 
Following their recognition as a distinct form of intellectual property rights in the TRIPS agreement, 
GIs have also received significant international attention outside of the EU (Moschini 2004). In 
particular, significant interest in GIs has emerged recently among developing countries.
3  
As for other types of brands (e.g., trademarks), the ability of GIs to alleviate market failures 
due  to  the  presence  of  asymmetric  information  rests  on  their  credibility,  thus  necessitating  IP 
protection.  While  trademark  protection  is  well  established  and  relatively  harmonized  across 
countries, the protection of GIs varies to a large degree, and its implementation is a question of 
intense disagreement in ongoing WTO negotiations. The TRIPS agreement requires countries to 
                                                           
1 Other agricultural products not intended for human consumption are ornamental plants, flowers, 
cork, hay, cochineal, wool, wicker and essential oils. 
 
2 See the definition of GIs in the TRIPS agreement (Article 22.1).  
 
3For example, several countries are introducing or expanding their own GI laws, regulations and 
promotion programs including China (Xiaobing and Kireeva 2007), India (Rao 2006), South Korea 
(Suh  and  MacPherson  2007),  and  Colombia  (Teuber  2010).  Noteworthy  is  the  Kenian-Swiss 
ongoing project aimed at establishing a functioning GI protection scheme in Kenya and at raising 
awareness  on  GIs  in  the  East  African  Community  member  states  (see  the  Swiss  Institute  of 
Intellectual Property’s website at https://www.ige.ch/en.html).  6 
 
provide legal means for protecting GIs against unfair competition, but it does not specify the means 
by which protection should be provided.  
Two  primary  legal  notions,  marks  and  appellations,  essentially  two  alternative  forms  of 
certification, are used to protect GIs. Where marks are used, generally in common law countries 
including the United States, GIs are protected within the trademark system and are usually registered 
as certification marks.
4 Certification marks simply certify that products meet given conditions and, in 
the  case  of  GIs,  the only  such  condition  is  the geographic  area  of  production.  It  is  critical  to 
emphasize that the right to use a certification mark is collective in nature. In the case of a GI in the 
form of a certification mark, all producers that operate within the geographic area indicated by the 
GI have access to certification and can use (subject to obtaining certification) the GI to label their 
products. In contrast, usage rights over trademarks are private and belong to a single entity or firm. 
Only under special circumstances, specifically when a geographic term has acquired a “secondary 
meaning,” can a GI be registered as a trademark.
5 When this is the case the rights over the GI are 
private and belong to a single entity or firm. 
Alternatively, GIs are protected through so-called sui generis schemes based on appellations, 
originally developed  and  used  in Roman  law  countries,  and  currently adopted  in  the  European 
Union (OECD 2000), several Asian and a few North American and Latin American countries
6 
(WIPO 2007). The main distinctive characteristic of a sui generis scheme is the requirement of a 
specific link between a good’s qualities and its geographical origin. In other words, for a geographic 
name that identifies a given good to be eligible to receive IP protection in the form of an appellation, 
evidence must be provided that the quality or characteristics of the good are due to the natural and 
human factors (e.g., climate, soil quality, local knowledge) characterizing the geographic area of 
origin (EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 2 and Art. 4.2.f). This requirement for appellations rests on the notion 
of “terroir,” the idea that the nature and characteristics of the geographic location of production are 
responsible for the goods’ distinct quality attributes of interest to consumers. 
                                                           
4 In the United States, certification marks used for GIs are registered with the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office. 
 
5 This means that when the “secondary meaning” of a geographic name in consumers’ minds is a 
production or manufacturing source (while the primary meaning is the geographic place), then it is 
possible under US trademark law to register a geographic name as a trademark, a private rather than 
collective IP right (USPTO 2007). 
 
6 These include China, Mongolia, North Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba and 
Costa Rica. 7 
 
In  addition  to  the  existence  of  a  specific  quality/geography  link,  the  sui  generis  scheme 
requires the definition of a code of rules for each GI product (commonly referred to in the literature 
as the specification). The specification details all the product characteristics
7 and the geographic area 
of production, and effectively mandates two conditions: (i) a minimum level of quality that the 
product needs to satisfy, and (ii) the geographic area in which production takes place (EU Reg. 
510/2006 Art. 4).  
The  US system  for  GIs  based  on  certification marks,  by contrast, does not  require  the 
existence of any link between quality and geography – in fact the patent office does not scrutinize 
certification mark applications based on the characteristics to be certified or require the definition of 
quality standards. Indeed, when a certification mark includes a geographic name it is understood that 
the only attribute to be certified is the origin of the good (USPTO 2007). 
Finally, with the sui generis scheme, usage rights over a GI are granted to all producers within 
a designated production area who comply with the product specification (EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 8).  
Hence, GIs,  whether  in  the  form  of  certification  marks  or appellations,  are  a  collective  form  of 
property rights (i.e., collective brands). 
 
3.  Model 
Our  model  can  be characterized  as a  dynamic  discrete  time model  with a  period-between-sales 
interest  rate  of  0. r >   We  consider  the  market  for  an  experience  good  (e.g.,  parmesan  cheese, 
sparkling wine, dry-cured ham) that can be produced in a continuum of qualities indexed by  . q + Îℝ  
We assume that all products in the market are subject to a minimum quality standard (MQS),  0 0, q >  
which can be interpreted as the minimum quality necessary to ensure consumer safety and sanitary 
conditions. The MQS is enforced. 
We assume that there are two types of production areas, the GI regions and the other 
regions, and that each single region is identified by a distinctive name. Two different production 
technologies exist: the GI technology and the standard technology. The GI technology is available in 
each of the GI regions but not in the other regions, the standard technology is only available in the 
other regions. The technologies, represented by the cost functions  ( ) G c q  and  ( ) c q  respectively, 
satisfy standard assumptions. Specifically,  ( ) G c q  and  ( ), c q  are assumed to be continuous, (strictly) 
                                                           
7  The  product  characteristics  include  the  physical,  chemical,  microbiological  and  organoleptic 
characteristics of the raw materials and of the final product. 8 
 
increasing and (strictly) convex functions of quality,  . q  Hence,  ( ) 0, q c q >
 
( ) 0, qq c q >
 
( ) 0, G
q c q >  and 
( ) 0.
G
qq c q >  Furthermore, we assume that the GI technology displays a comparative advantage in the 
production of the upper-end of the quality spectrum,  . q q > ɶ  Specifically, 
 
for all   ,    ( ) ( ),
for all   ,    ( ) ( ),
G
G
q q c q c q





where q ɶ is such that  ( ) ( ).
G c q c q = ɶ ɶ  The comparative advantage assumption is intended to capture the 
notion of “terroir,” the fact that the nature and characteristics of the conditions of production in the 
GI  regions  facilitate  the  attainment  of  quality.  Specifically,  we  assume  that  the  comparative 
advantage  in the  high-quality  range  confers  the GI  regions the  quality/geography  nexus  that  is 
necessary for eligibility to receive IP protection under a sui generis scheme.  
We assume that all producers are price-takers and that the industry (both the standard and 
the GI-certified product sectors) is characterized by free entry.
 The role of competitive markets and 
free entry into the GI sector has been discussed by Moschini, Menapace and Pick (2008), and we 
refer the reader to their paper for additional details. While for simplicity, we assume that each active 
firm produces a fixed quantity of output per period, normalized to unity, we let each firm choose a 
sequence of qualities to maximize the present value of profits.
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3.1. Branding Options: Trademarks and GI Labels 
In addition to choosing quality, producers use brands to differentiate their products from those of 
other producers. A brand can be a trademark, a mix of a trademark and a GI label or a GI label. A 
GI label takes the form of an appellation or a certification mark depending upon whether a sui generis 
scheme or a certification mark scheme is in place. Trademarks and mixed brands (i.e., combinations 
of a trademark and a GI label) are used to convey firm-specific reputations. GI labels alone convey 
collective reputations. We assume that each producer can, at any time, adopt and use a trademark at 
no cost and that there is an infinite supply of potential trademark names. Instead, to be able to use a 
GI label, a producer needs to obtain certification.  
                                                           
8 By fixing the size of the firm, we abstract from the issues regarding the presence of economies or 
diseconomies of scale in establishing reputation. The issue of economies of scale in establishing 
collective reputation has been addressed in a recent working paper by Fishman et al. 2008. The 
relationship between firm size, investment in quality and individual brand reputation is investigated 
by Choi (1997), Cabral (2000) and Rob and Fishman (2005). 9 
 
Whether a producer is able to obtain certification depends upon two sets of conditions – 
accessibility  of  certification  and  the  certification  requirements  –  which  vary  across  certification 
schemes. We say that producers in a given area have access to certification when they have the right 
to register the geographic name of their production area as a GI. With regard to accessibility we 
consider two options: schemes that require the existence of a quality/geography nexus and schemes 
that do not. Schemes that require the existence of a quality/geography nexus (e.g., the sui generis 
scheme) limit accessibility to certification to producers that operate in a GI region (by definition, GI 
regions are characterized by the GI technology and the quality/geography nexus). Schemes that do 
not require the existence of a quality/geography nexus (e.g., the certification marks scheme) make 
certification available to producers in all regions. 
Once  a  geographic  name  is  registered,  the  right  to  use  it  to  brand  a  given  product  is 
conditional  on  the  product  meeting  the  scheme’s  certification  requirements.  We  consider  two 
requirements:  a  location  of  production  and  an  MQS  requirement.  To  satisfy  the  location  of 
production requirement, a product needs to be produced in the geographic area corresponding to 
the GI label. In other words, GI labels must be truthful with regard to the geographic origin of the 
good. To satisfy the MQS requirement, a product needs to meet a GI-specific MQS,  0 . G q  We assume 
that  0
G q  is scheme specific, meaning that it can vary across different schemes but is the same for all 
GI labels registered under the same scheme, and is such that  0 0. G q q ³  This last assumption means 
that the minimum quality standard imposed by a GI scheme is at least as strict as the baseline 
standard that applies to all products. 
Consistent with the collective nature of GI rights, we assume that all producers that satisfy 
the certification requirements for a given GI are entitled, subject to paying the certification cost, to 
use  the  GI  to  brand  their  products.  A  GI  label  can  be  used  in  addition  to,  or  in  place  of,  a 
trademark. We assume the per-period, per-unit certification cost to be the same across all considered 
schemes and to be equal to  . w  Finally, we postulate an economy with a fully credible trademark 
system and a fully credible certification scheme for GIs (i.e., there is no counterfeit product on the 
market and all certified products meet the requirements established by the certification scheme).  
 
3.2. Reputation and Information Structure 
In the economic literature on branding, the ability of sellers to develop a reputation rests on the 
ability of brands to convey information regarding the firm’s actions or characteristics (or both). 10 
 
Consumers, who at the time of purchase cannot observe product quality but observe brands, rely for 
their purchase decisions on the firms’ reputations captured by their brands. In the literature on the 
economics of information, the concept of reputation is formalized in various ways depending upon 
the  source  of  the  uncertainty  regarding  quality  (Bar-Isaac  and  Tadelis  2008).  When  quality 
uncertainty  is  due  to  unobservable  characteristics  (markets  primarily  characterized  by  adverse 
selection problems), reputation is commonly modeled as consumer beliefs regarding a firm’s type 
and is assumed to evolve based on signals (e.g., the firm’s performance). When, as in our case, the 
uncertainty regarding quality is  primarily  due  to  unobservable  actions (markets characterized by 
moral  hazard  problems),  reputation  is  conceptualized  as  a  firm’s  past  quality,  and  a  “good” 
reputation is assumed to persist until the firm cheats by cutting its quality. The latter notion of 
reputation is based on the seminal papers of Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983).  
For convenience, we adopt the simplest form of reputation building proposed by Shapiro 
(1983). Specifically, we assume that firms acquire reputation by selling high quality product at low 
prices over one period of time. We assume that reputation,  , R  is common knowledge among all 
consumers  in  a  given  market,  is  market-specific,
9  brand-specific,  and  adjusts  immediately  from 
period to period. Hence, for a brand k at time t , 
  1.
k k
t t R q - =   (1) 
In our context, a brand  k can be a trademark, a mix of a trademark and a GI label or a GI label. 
Consumers identify products of different firms through brands and make purchase decisions based 
on the firms’ reputations for quality as conveyed by the brands. Consumers are rational and have full 
information about technologies, MQSs, and the other parameters of the model but cannot observe 
quality.  In  addition,  consumers  cannot  observe  which  technology  was  used,  the  location  of 
production or brand ownership.  
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their taste for quality but consider brands of 
like quality to be perfect substitutes.
10 We assume that there is a continuum of consumer types, 
[0, ], q q Î  with distribution  ( ). F q  Consistent with previous literature, we assume that consumers 
                                                           
9 This assumption is relevant for the discussion of the trade implications of GI protection. 
 
10  It  is  taste  heterogeneity  with  regard  to  quality  that  supports  a  range  of  different  qualities 
exchanged  in  equilibrium.  We  recognize that  some consumers  might  value the  very fact that  a 
product is produced in a specific geographic area independently of the actual quality of the product. 
For simplicity, our model only considers consumer preferences over quality. 
 11 
 
purchase the quality that provides the highest positive surplus, and otherwise buy nothing, where the 
surplus from purchasing quality q at price  ( ) p q  for a consumer of type q is given by 
  ( ; ) ( ). U q p q q -  
We make the following standard assumptions regarding consumers: (i) consumers value quality; (ii) 
the marginal utility of quality is decreasing; (iii) consumers with higher taste for quality (higher values 
of q) value quality more; and (iv) the marginal utility of quality is larger for consumers with higher 
values of q. Mathematically, we have  0, q U >
 
0, qq U <
 
0, Uq >  and  0. q Uq >
 
Because consumers 
cannot observe quality at the time of purchase and rely on reputation, which evolves according to 
equation (1), producers can surprise consumers (for one period) with a lower quality than expected. 
Such a quality cut is discovered by consumers with a one-period delay, and consumers punish the 
seller by boycotting the brand thereafter (Allen 1984).
11 
 
4.  Long-Run Partial Equilibrium 
We consider a rational-expectation,
 stationary Nash equilibrium in a long-run partial equilibrium 
setting.
12 Specifically, the reputation equilibrium we consider is a steady state configuration with a 
price function across qualities,  ( ) p q , and a distribution of firms,  ( ) n q , such that (i) each consumer, 
knowing  ( ) p q , chooses his most preferred quality level or decides not to purchase anything; (ii) 
markets clear at every level of quality (thus determining  ( ) n q ); (iii) any firm with reputation  R finds 
it optimal to produce quality q R =  rather than to deviate; and (iv) there is no entry or exit. 
We focus on the case in which land and all other factors of production are in perfectly elastic 
supply and derive the price-quality schedule relying on cost considerations (because in a long-run 
equilibrium with perfectly elastic factor supplies, output prices are determined exclusively by costs) 
and  basic  assumptions  regarding  consumer  preferences:  (i)  consumers  are  indifferent  between 
products of equal quality; (ii) utility is strictly increasing in quality and strictly decreasing in the price 
                                                           
11 Because brand ownership is not observable to consumers, a producer that has cheated and has 
lost all his customers could re-enter the market using a different brand. 
 
12 Consumer expectations of quality are adaptive but rational in equilibrium: consumers expect firms 
to maintain their reputation and firms do. 
 12 
 
paid for quality; and (iii) consumers have heterogeneous preferences regarding quality.
13 We believe 
that the assumption of perfectly elastic factor supply is justifiable in the context of markets for food 
and agricultural products that are broadly defined (e.g., extra virgin olive oil, wine). In these markets, 
we  observe  the  presence  of  many  private  brands  and  numerous  GI  labels  from  a  variety  of 
geographical areas (for example, in the European Union over one hundred GIs for extra virgin olive 
oil and several thousand GIs for wines are currently registered).
14  
In  what  follows,  we  consider  three  IP  scenarios  and,  for  each  scenario,  we  derive  the 
equilibrium market price-quality schedule. The first scenario, our benchmark case, is one in which 
trademarks  are  the  only  branding  option.  In  the  second  and  third  scenarios,  we  consider  two 
alternative  certification  schemes  for  GIs,  the  sui  generis  scheme  based  on  appellations  and  the 
certification mark scheme respectively.  
 
4.1.  The Benchmark Case with Trademarks Only 
In this section, we derive the equilibrium market price-quality schedule when, absent a certification 
scheme,  trademarks  are  the  only  available  branding  option  for  producers.  First,  consider  a 
representative firm that uses the standard technology and whose reputation in equilibrium is equal to 
q. If this firm remains honest, it earns a discounted profit equal to  1 ( ) ( ) r
r p q c q + -     , while, if it 
cheats, the most profitable avenue is to cut quality to the minimum level thereby earning a one-
period profit equal to  0 ( ) ( ). p q c q -  The credibility constraint, which determines the range of prices at 
which a producer has no incentive to cheat, can therefore be written as  
  0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . p q c q r c q c q ³ + -      
As in Shapiro (1983), we argue that the presence of a potentially infinite supply of fly-by-night sellers 
who  could  overrun  the  market  with  minimum  quality  and  the  fact  that  consumers  know  that 
product quality is at least equal to the minimum level,  0, q  imply that the entry price for a new brand, 
, e p  is equal to the cost of producing minimum quality,  0 ( ). c q  Hence,  0 ( ). e p c q =  In equilibrium, a 
                                                           
13 Assumptions (i) and (ii) rule out “irrelevant” price-quality combinations. Assumption (iii) supports 
a range of different qualities to be exchanged in equilibrium. 
 
14 See the DOOR and E-BACCUS databases on the EU’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/database/index_en.htm and  
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/wine/e-bacchus/.  13 
 
potential entrant incurs a sure loss equal to  0 ( ) ( ) c q c q -  in the entry period when the brand is still 
unknown and earns a profit equal to  ( ) ( ) p q c q -  in any subsequent period. Free entry, which requires 
discounted  profits  of  potential  new  brands  to  be  non-positive,  1
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
r c q c q p q c q - + - £     , 
imposes a second restriction on the equilibrium price configuration, which can be written as  
  0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . p q c q r c q c q £ + -      
Together the credibility constraint and the free-entry condition imply an equilibrium price-quality 
schedule for producers who use the standard technology equal to 
  0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for  . A q c q r c q c q q q º + - ³       (2) 
Similar  conditions  can  be  derived  for  producers  who  use  the  GI  technology.  Given  that  the 
technology of production is undetectable for consumers, and that the cost of in-house production of 
minimum quality using the GI technology exceeds the cost of outsourcing production to firms that 
use the standard technology,  0 0 ( ) ( ),
G c q c q >  the most profitable cheating option for these producers 
is outsourcing at a cost equal to  0 ( ). c q  The credibility constraint for producers who use the GI 
technology is then equal to 
 
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . G G p q c q r c q c q   ³ + -    
Being unable to detect the technology of production, consumers are willing to pay  0 ( ) c q  for any 
reputationless  brand  independently  of  the  actual  technology  used.  The  free  entry  condition  for 
producers who use the GI technology is then equal to 
 
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . G G p q c q r c q c q   £ + -    
Hence,  the  credibility  constraint  and  the  free-entry  condition  for  producers  who  use  the  GI 
technology imply an equilibrium price-quality schedule equal to  
  0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for  . G G N q c q r c q c q q q   º + - ³     (3) 
Because consumers are indifferent between products of equal quality (hence, they would purchase 
only brands with the lowest price for any given quality), and given that consumer utility is strictly 
increasing in quality (hence, consumers purchase only brands with the highest quality at any given 
price), from (2) and (3), the market price-quality schedule that prevails in equilibrium – absent a GI 
scheme – is 14 
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where q ɶ is the quality level that separates the comparative advantage ranges of the two technologies. 
The market schedule,  ( ), P q  is represented in Figure 1 by the bold curve. 
 
 
Figure 1. Market Price-Quality Schedule with Trademarks Only 
 
4.2.  The Sui Generis Certification Scheme based on Appellations 
Three features (the geographic/quality nexus, the product specification and the collective nature) 
characterize the sui generis scheme and distinguish GI labels (i.e., here appellations) from trademarks. 
First, eligibility for registration and protection of a geographic name as an appellation requires a 
demonstrable  link  between  the  characteristics  of  a  specific  geographic  region  and  the  quality 
attributes of the product. No such nexus between geography and quality is required for registration 
and protection of a trademark. In our setup, only the names of the GI regions, identified through GI 
logos,
15 receive IP protection with the sui generis scheme. Hence, only producers that use the GI 
technology have access to certification. 
Second, the sui generis scheme requires the establishment of the product specification that 
includes  two  certification  requirements:  a  GI-specific  MQS  and  a  location  of  production 
                                                           
15 While trademarks are identified by the ® or the TM symbols, appellations with the EU’s sui generis 








requirement. Hence, all GI certified product must be of quality equal to or in excess of  0
G q  and must 
have been produced in the area identified by the GI label.
16  
Third, usage rights over a GI label are granted to all producers within the GI area who meet 
the MQS requirement. Hence, when a sui generis certification scheme is in place, all firms using the 
GI technology that produce a quality equal to or in excess of  0
G q  can certify their product at a per-
period cost  w and can use the GI label corresponding to their area of production for branding. 
These  firms  can  also  elect  to  use  a  trademark  in  addition to  the  GI label.  Whether  or  not an 
additional  trademark  is  used,  the  cost  of  producing  and  certifying  quality  0
G q q ³   is  equal  to 
( ) .
G c q w +  
The derivation of the equilibrium price-quality schedule for producers who certify requires 
discussing the entry price that consumers are willing to pay for a new GI-certified product, and the 
best cheating option for producers. By a “new GI-certified product” we mean any product that is 
sold on the market with a pure GI label (i.e., without a trademark) or with a mixed brand (i.e., a GI 
label and a trademark) when the trademark is unknown to consumers.
17   
First, we argue that the entry price for a new GI-certified product is  0 ( ) . G G c q w +  To this end, 
we note that consumers know that a GI-certified product is produced using the GI technology and 
is of quality at least  0 .
G q  Consumers also know that the quality produced by an entrant who certifies 
and wants to stay in business must be such that the entrant’s brand is (at least weakly) preferred over 
alternative brands of equal quality once reputation is built and, hence, that the quality must be above 
                                                           
16 In a setup like ours in which all GI regions are characterized by the same GI technology and in 
which consumers care about quality but have no preference over origin per se, the presence of a 
location of production requirement does not generate additional information compared to the case 
of  a  scheme  that  conditions  eligibility  to  the  existence  of  a  quality/geography  nexus  and  is 
characterized by an MQS requirement alone. Nevertheless, the distinction between the eligibility 
condition  and  the  location  of  production  requirement  is  important  to  meaningfully  discuss  the 
welfare properties of alternative certification schemes that are used or that could be used for food 
products. 
 
17 Any GI-certified product that is sold without a trademark is expected from consumers to be of 




18 Given these pieces of information, a new GI-certified product represents a 
bargain at a price  0 ( ) . G G c q w +  At the same time, any price above  0 ( ) G G c q w +  would attract fly-by-
night producers into the market hence, it is assumed that consumers protect themselves from such 
potential suppliers by refusing to pay more than  0 ( ) .
G G c q w +  
Second, we note that the presence of certification limits the cheating options for producers. 
Once a mixed brand is known to consumers to be GI-certified, the firm must continue certifying the 
product; otherwise consumers would anticipate that the firm is cheating.
19 Conditional on certifying, 
the most profitable cheating avenue is to produce minimum quality  0
G q  at cost  0 ( ) . G G c q w +  Based on 
these considerations regarding the entry price and the best cheating option, we conclude that the 
price-quality schedule for producers who certify is equal to 
  0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) +      for  . G G G G G G q c q r c q c q q q w   º + - ³     (5) 
Producers who use the GI technology can also decide not to certify. In this case, producers 
can choose any quality equal to or above the baseline minimum quality,  0, q q ³  which costs  ( ) G c q  to 
produce. Without certification, their only branding option is to use trademarks. Because consumers 
cannot observe the technology used in production, the entry price for these producers must be equal 
to the entry price for unknown brands produced with the standard technology,  0 ( ). c q  In addition, 
because  0 0 ( ) ( ),
G c q c q >  the most profitable cheating option is to outsource the production of  0 q  at 
a cost  0 ( ). c q  It follows that the price-quality schedule for producers who use the GI technology but 
do not certify coincides with (3). Finally, the presence of a sui generis scheme does not affect the 
price-quality schedule of producers who use the standard technology. For them, the price-quality 
schedule coincides with (2). 
                                                           
18 As explained below, the quality must be at least  { } 0 ˆ min , G q q q ³   where  ˆ q is defined as the quality 
at which (5) and (2) intersect. 
 
19 In the case of a firm using a pure GI label as a brand, discontinuing certification means selling an 
unbranded product, which is expected by consumers to be of baseline minimum quality  0. q   17 
 
To focus on the relevant case in which, for all certification schemes considered, reputation 
building  through  certification  is  a  viable  option,  in  what  follows  we  assume  that  the  following 
parametric condition holds:
20 
  ( ) ( ) { } ( ) 0 0 0 min , . G G r c q c q c q w   < -    
  (6) 
The market price-quality schedule prevailing in the presence of a sui generis scheme corresponds to 
the “lower envelope” of the three schedules in (2), (3) and (5). Its mathematical form, which is given 
by (7), varies depending on the value of  0
G q  and requires the following implicit definitions of  ˆ, q   , q  
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Depending  on  the  value  of  0 ,
G q   we  identify  three  cases  corresponding  to  (a)  0 0 [ , ) G q q q Î ,  (b) 
0 [ , )
G q q q Î  and (c)  0 . G q q ³  In all cases, (a), (b) and (c), the schedule corresponds to that of the 
producers using the standard technology in the bottom range of the quality spectrum (for q smaller 
than  ˆ q,  1 q  and  q ɶ respectively) and to that of the GI-certified producers in the upper range of the 
quality spectrum (for  q larger than  ˆ q in case (a) and larger that the GI-specific MQS,  0 , G q  in cases 
(b) and (c)). In case (c) only, the intermediate range of quality spectrum, between  q ɶ and  2, q  is 
supplied by producers who use the GI technology and do not certify. Moreover, while in case (a), 
the schedule is continuous, in cases (b) and (c) the schedule presents a discontinuity, indicating a 
                                                           
20 For given functional forms of the cost functions and for given values of  r  and  0, q  this restriction 
places an upper bound on the value of the certification cost,  , w  or a lower bound on the value of 
the GI-specific minimum quality standard,  0 . G q     18 
 
quality gap that is typical in the presence of production technologies with comparative advantage 
over different quality ranges.
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  (7) 
The market price-quality schedule,  ( ), G P q  is represented by the bold curve in Figures 2(i) and 2(ii). 
Specifically, Figure 2(i) represents case (a) where  0 0 [ , ) G q q q Î  and Figure 2(ii) represents case (c) 
where  0 . G q q ³  To facilitate comparison, the dashed curve in Figures 2(i) and 2(ii) represents the 
price-quality schedule,  ( ), P q  that would prevail absent a certification scheme. Finally to keep the 
pictures as clean as possible, the value of the certification cost,  , w  is considered to be equal to zero. 
 
Figure 2(i): Case (a)  Figure 2(ii): Case (c) 
Figure 2. Market Price-Quality Schedule with a Sui Generis Scheme 
 
                                                           
21  Quality  gaps  in  the  presence  of  production  technologies  with  comparative  advantage  over 
different quality ranges appear also in Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) and in Flam and Helpman 



















4.3.  The Certification Scheme Based on Certification Marks 
IP protection for GIs in the United States is provided through the trademark system usually as 
certification marks. An example of a GI protected as a certification mark is “Washington Apples.” 
This  mark  certifies  that  the  apples  are  produced  in  the  state  of  Washington,  while  no  quality 
standard is needed to be met by producers (Winfree and McCluskey 2005). A critical feature of the 
trademark system is that certification marks that consist of geographic names can only be use to 
certify the geographic origin of products, while normally no additional requirements can be included 
in the mark definition. Nor is the eligibility for registration of a certification mark that consists of a 
geographic name conditioned upon the presence of a link between quality and geography (USPTO 
2007). Given these features, the certification mark system can be framed in our setup as a scheme 
with no limitation regarding accessibility to certification (i.e., every region’s name is eligible to be 
protected  as  a  certification  mark),  with  a  location  of  production  requirement  and  no  MQS 
requirement. With this scheme, a GI label in the form of a certification mark informs consumers 
that the certified product originates in the area indicated by the label.  
Following the same procedure used thus far, we derive the market price-quality schedule that 
prevails under a certification mark scheme. Here, we assume that consumers have no knowledge 
regarding which technology is available in which area and hence are not able to infer the production 
technology from the GI label (this assumption will be relaxed in section 5.1). Now, for a producer 
who uses the standard technology and certifies, the cost of quality  0 q q ³  is equal to  ( ) . c q w +  In 
equilibrium, if a firm with reputation equal to q remains honest, it earns a discounted profit equal to 
1 ( ) ( ) r
r p q c q w + - -    , while, if it cheats, the most profitable avenue is to cut quality to the minimum 
level while continuing to certify, thereby earning a one-period profit equal to  0 ( ) ( ) . p q c q w - -
22  The 
credibility constraint can therefore be written as  
  0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . p q c q r c q c q w ³ + - +      
Given the potentially large number of non-GI regions (and hence of certification marks 
from non-GI regions), we argue that the entry price for a new certified brand under the certification 
                                                           
22 The firm must continue certifying the product; otherwise, consumers would correctly infer that 
the firm is cheating. 
 20 
 
mark scheme is  0 ( ) . c q w +
23 This is based upon the argument that consumers protect themselves 
from  potential  suppliers  from  non-GI  regions  by  refusing  to  pay  more  than  0 ( ) . c q w +   In 
equilibrium, a potential entrant incurs a sure loss equal to  0 ( ) ( ) c q c q -  in the entry period when the 
brand is still unknown and earns a profit equal to  ( ) ( ) p q c q w - -  in any subsequent period. Free 
entry,  which  requires  discounted  profits  of  potential  new  brands  to  be  non-positive, 
1
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
r c q c q p q c q w - + - - £     ,  imposes  the  following  restriction  on  the  equilibrium  price 
configuration: 
  0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . p q c q r c q c q w £ + - +      
Together the credibility constraint and the free-entry condition imply an equilibrium price-quality 
schedule for producers who use the standard technology and certify equal to 
  0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for  . B q c q r c q c q q q w º + - + ³       (8) 
The cost  of  quality  0 q q ³ ,  for  producers who use  the  GI  technology  and certify, is  ( ) . G c q w +  
Because consumers cannot infer the production technology from the GI label, they are willing to 
pay the same amount for any new certified brand. Hence the entry price for producers who use the 
GI technology and certify must be equal to  0 ( ) . c q w +  Also, their best cheating option is to cut 
quality to  0 q  and continue to certify at a cost  0 ( ) . G c q w +  Based on the entry price and the best 
cheating option, we can conclude that the equilibrium price-quality schedule for producers who use 
the GI technology and certify is equal to 
  0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for  . G G H q c q r c q c q q q w   º + - + ³     (9) 
Finally, the presence of a certification mark scheme does not affect the price-quality schedule of 
producers who use the standard technology and do not certify – for whom the price-quality schedule 
coincides with (2) – or the price-quality schedule of producers who use the GI technology and do 
not certify – for whom the price-quality schedule coincides with (3). 
Given (2), (3), (8) and (9), it can be readily seen that, for any value of  0, w ³  the market 
price-quality schedule prevailing in the presence of a certification mark scheme coincides with  ( ), P q  
as given by (4), and, in fact, for any value of  , q   ( ) ( ) B q A q ³  and  ( ) ( ). H q N q ³  We can conclude that, 
                                                           
23 Consistently, by a “new certified brand” we mean a GI label in the form of a certification mark or 
a mixed brand when the trademark is unknown to consumers. 21 
 
when  consumers  have  no  knowledge  regarding  what  technology  is  available  in  which  area,  the 
market price-quality schedule prevailing in the presence of a certification mark scheme is identical to 
the schedule prevailing absent any GI scheme,  ( ). P q   
 
5.  Welfare Implications 
Depending on whether or not a sui generis scheme is in place, the market price-quality schedule that 
prevails in equilibrium is  ( ) G P q  or  ( ). P q  As is typical in this type of reputation model, the minimum 
quality,  0, q   for  which  no  informational  problems  exist,  sells  at  production  cost.  Similarly,  the 
minimum quality guaranteed by the sui generis scheme,  0 ,
G q  also sells at production cost when the 
product is certified.
24 Any other quality  q in excess of the minimum quality,  0, q  sells at a premium 
above production costs that is exactly equal to the one-time information cost that is needed in order 
to establish a reputation for quality  . q  
As can be easily verified by comparing (4) and (7), the price-quality schedules  ( )
G P q  or  ( ) P q
overlap  in  the  bottom  range  of  the  quality  spectrum,  while  in  the  upper  range  of  the  quality 
spectrum  ( )
G P q  lies below  ( ) P q . This means that the presence of a sui generis scheme leads to lower 
prices for high-quality products while the prices of lower qualities are unaffected. Lower prices for 
high-quality products are the result of reduced costs of establishing reputation in the upper quality 
range under the sui generis scheme. The cost reduction has two components, each of which is linked 
to  the  revelation  of  some  information  regarding  the  GI-certified  product.  The  first  piece  of 
information regards the fact that the GI-certified product is produced with the GI technology (i.e., 
that the conditions of the area of production favor the attainment of quality). For any given value of 
the  GI-specific  MQS,  0 , G q   such  that  0 , G q q < ɶ   the  availability  of  the  information  regarding  the 
technology of production curtails producers’ incentives to milk their reputation by  0 0 ( ) ( ) G G G c q c q -  
thereby  increasing  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  a  new  GI-certified  product  by  the  same 
amount.
25 The second piece of information concerns the fact that the GI-certified product meets a 
stricter MQS than does a generic product,  0 0. G q q >  This curtails producers’ incentives to milk their 
                                                           
24 Clearly, certified quality  0
G q  is viable only for  0 .
G q q ³   
25 This effect occurs only for  0 , G q q < ɶ  where  0 0 ( ) ( ). G G G c q c q <  22 
 
reputation by an additional  0 0 ( ) ( ) G c q c q -  and, by the same amount, increases consumers’ willingness 
to pay for a new GI-certified product.  
To the contrary, no information is revealed under the certification mark scheme that could 
lower  the  cost  of  building  reputation  compared  to  the  case  with  trademarks  only.  Because  all 
geographic  names  can  be protected  as  GIs,  registration itself  does  not  convey  any information 
regarding the actual technology used in production. As well, because no GI-specific MQS needs to 
be met, producers’ incentive to milk their reputation is unchanged compared to the case in which 
only trademarks are used. 
Given the effect on equilibrium market prices, the introduction of a sui generis scheme affects 
consumers and producers in different ways. Consumers, to the extent that they prefer high quality, 
are clearly better off with lower prices, while the effect on producer surplus depends upon whether 
or not the investment in reputation occurred before the introduction of the sui generis scheme. With 
zero discounted profits for new brands under every IP scenario, only producers with established 
brands  (i.e.,  those  that  have  invested  in  reputation  before  the  introduction  of  the  certification 
scheme) can be affected by the introduction of the sui generis scheme. We can conclude that the 
introduction of a sui generis scheme has the potential to increase aggregate welfare because it reduces 
the informational cost of building reputation for high quality in a market affected by asymmetric 
information problems. This conclusion provides a rationale for favoring a sui generis scheme over a 
certification mark scheme to provide IP protection for GIs. Moreover, the welfare gains are more 
likely to be larger when the introduction of the sui generis scheme occurs at an earlier stage, i.e., 
before the investments in reputation are sunk.  
When the introduction of a sui generis scheme occurs after investments in reputation have 
taken  place  (hereafter  ex  post),  welfare  considerations  regarding  the  introduction  of  a  sui  generis 
scheme  need  to  take  into  account  the  effect  on  established  producers  (i.e.,  producers  of  an 
established brand). Starting from a situation of equilibrium in which producers have already invested 
in  reputation,  we  analyze  the  case  in  which  the  government  considers  introducing  a  sui  generis 
scheme. While established producers in the bottom-end range of the quality spectrum will not be 
affected  by  the  introduction  of  the  scheme,  producers  in  the  upper-end  range  of  the  quality 
spectrum might completely or partially lose their investment in reputation.  
The  bottom-end  range  of  the  quality  spectrum  in  which  established  producers  are  not 
affected by the introduction of the scheme corresponds to 
*, q q £  where 
* q  represents the quality 23 
 
of the non-certified product that would be purchased by the type of consumer who is indifferent 
between consuming a GI-certified product under the sui generis scheme and a non-certified product.
26 
For all other qualities, 
*, q q >  established producers are at risk of completely or partially losing their 
investment in reputation when the sui generis scheme is introduced.  
Specifically, there will be established brands that completely lose their reputation and are 
replaced by new GI-certified brands of the same qualities. Define the quality range 
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In an equilibrium without a sui generis scheme, the qualities in 
0 Q are supplied by producers 
that use the standard technology. As shown in appendix A1, if a sui generis scheme were introduced, 
all producers with established brands in the quality range 
0 Q  would lose their reputation because the 
introduction  of  a  sui  generis  scheme  makes  cheating  more  attractive  than  maintaining  the  same 
quality. Finally, if these producers have access to the GI technology (e.g., when they can relocate to a 
GI region) or can sell their trademarks to producers within the GI region, then the loss of reputation 
is only partial. That producers operating in this quality range need to switch to a different technology 
to  remain competitive  is  noteworthy  because  the technology  they  switch to  is  characterized by 
higher production costs.  
Established  brands  in  the  quality  range 
0 Q   are  not  the  only  brands  produced  with  the 
standard technology that stand to completely lose their reputation. Depending on the shape of 
consumer preferences over quality, there will be a range of qualities to the left of 
0 Q  produced with 
the  standard  technology,  and  such  that 
*, q q >   that  no  longer  represents  “good  deals”  for 
consumers, who now would rather purchase GI-certified products. These qualities will no longer be 
exchanged in the market.  
Contrary to what intuition might suggest, the reputations of established brands produced 
with  the  GI  technology  (all  of  which  are  of  quality  q q ³ ɶ)  are  also  negatively  affected  by  the 
introduction of the sui generis scheme. But, unlike the case of established brands produced using the 
                                                           
26 The value of 
* q  depends upon the shape of consumer preferences and on the value of  0 . G q  See 
Appendix A3 for details regarding consumers selection of qualities. 24 
 
standard technology, brands produced using the GI technology whose quality is at least  0
G q  face a 
partial loss in reputation and are not forced out of the market. As shown in appendix A2, in fact, 
their ability to certify affects their incentive to cheat. For them, the best response is to continue 
producing the same quality and to start certifying as soon as the system is introduced.
27 We conclude 
that, given the complete and partial losses in reputation of a subset of established producers, the ex 
post introduction of a sui generis scheme is desirable only if consumer gains are larger than the losses 
in reputation of established brands.
28  
Finally, we address the following question: if a sui generis scheme were to be introduced 
before any investment in reputation has taken place, what should the GI-specific MQS,  0 , G q  be in 
order to maximize aggregate welfare? From an ex ante
29 perspective, the optimal value of the GI-
specific MQS maximizes aggregate consumer surplus. The value of the GI-specific MQS affects the 
shape and position of the equilibrium market price-quality schedule and hence the price-quality 
combinations  that  are available to  consumers.  The  available  price-quality combinations, in  turn, 
determine the surplus that each consumer type can derive in the market. Hence, the specific welfare-
maximizing value of the GI-specific MQS will generally depend on the distribution of consumer 
types. Nevertheless, as discussed in appendix A3, for all distributions of consumer types the optimal 
value of the GI-specific MQS has to balance the welfare losses of consumers whose purchase is 
constrained by the value of  0
G q  and the welfare gains to consumers who purchase the GI-certified 
product. It follows that the welfare-maximizing value of the GI-specific MQS belongs in the quality 
range  above  , q e +   where  q e +   is  defined  as  the  smallest  value  of  0
G q   such  that  at  least  one 
consumer type purchases the quality level corresponding to the GI-specific MQS. 
 
                                                           
27 This is the case independent of whether or not the introduction of the system is announced ahead 
of time or unexpectedly introduced. 
 
28 Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration is the welfare loss that occurs during the 
“transition” period (i.e., the period in which investment takes place). During the transition period 
quality is misallocated; new entrants sell products of heterogeneous quality at the same price and 
consumers are unable to select the exact quality that maximizes their utility. 
 
29 As opposed to ex post, here ex ante refers to the case in which the introduction of the sui generis 
scheme occurs before any investment in reputation has taken place. 25 
 
5.1.  Welfare Implications of a Certification Mark Scheme with Screening 
Our conclusion that a certification mark scheme for GIs does not convey any information that 
could  lower  the  cost  of  building  reputation  below  the cost  required  when  only  trademarks  are 
available is predicated on two assumptions regarding consumers: (i) consumers have no knowledge 
regarding which technology is available in which area and (ii) consumers have no preferences over 
origin per se (rather than as a signal for quality). When either assumption is relaxed, there conceivably 
are  welfare  gains  from  a  certification  mark  scheme  over  a  situation  with  only  trademarks. 
Nevertheless, as we will show, the result that a sui generis scheme is preferable in terms of welfare to a 
scheme  based  on  certification  marks  holds  true  even  when  consumers  have  full  information 
regarding which technology is available in which area and value origin per se in addition to quality. 
To this end we consider the following modification of the certification mark system in which 
an initial screening of geographic names based on the presence of a quality/geography nexus is 
introduced. We refer to this hypothetical scheme as the technology scheme. A technology scheme 
yields the same market price-quality schedule that a certification mark scheme would yield under the 
assumption that consumers have full knowledge of the production conditions in each region. This is 
the case because in either case (with a technology scheme or with a certification mark scheme with 
full information about regional production conditions) the same information – the technology used 
in production – is available to consumers.  
Following the same procedure used thus far, we derive the market price-quality schedule that 
prevails with a technology scheme. The schedule can be written as follows:  
  0 ( ),     for  [ , )
( )
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where we define  t q  and  tt q  as  
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and  ( ), T q  the price-quality schedule for producers who use the GI technology and certify their 
product with the technology scheme, is   
 
0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for  . G G G T q c q r c q c q q q w   º + - + ³    
A comparison between (10) and (7) reveals that (i) for any given value of  0
G tt q q £  every consumer 
type is at least as well off with the sui generis scheme as with the technology scheme because of lower 26 
 
prices in the upper end of the quality range; and (ii) for any given value of  0
G tt q q >  the scheme that 
provides the largest welfare depends on the distribution of consumer types. Specifically, for  0
G tt q q >
the  sui  generis  scheme  leads  to  lower prices  in  the upper  part  of the  quality  spectrum,  favoring 
consumers with relatively high values of  , q  while the technology scheme might lead to lower prices 
in the intermediate quality range favoring consumers with intermediate values of  . q  Finally, if the 
value of  0
G q  can be chosen optimally so as to maximize aggregate welfare, the sui generis scheme is 
unambiguously better than the technology scheme for any given distribution of consumers. This is 
because it is always possible to set  0 0. G q q =   
The market price-quality schedule,  ( ), T P q  is represented by the bold curve in Figure 3. 
Specifically, Figure 3 represents the case with  0 . G tt q q £  To ease comparison, the schedule that would 
prevail with a sui generis scheme is also represented in Figure 3 by the dashed curve.  
 
Figure 3. Market Price-Quality Schedule with a Technology Scheme 
 
5.2.  Trade Implications 
In this section, we briefly discuss some welfare considerations regarding the introduction of a sui 
generis  scheme  in  a  trading  context  when  reputation  must  be  established  independently  in  each 
country. We maintain the same partial equilibrium setup, add a second country – the rest of the 
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the standard technology considered so far,  ( ), c q  and that the two countries are otherwise identical; 
in particular, they have the same MQS,  0, q  and discount rate,  . r  This setup is similar to Falvey 
(1989), but in Falvey each trading country has (only) one production technology, each with a range 
of comparative advantage. 
We maintain the assumption that a sui generis scheme is in place in the country that is home 
to the GI (the home country) and consider two alternative scenarios for ROW: (i) ROW provides 
the same type of IP protection for GI as the home country (e.g., the same sui generis scheme), (ii) 
ROW does not provide IP protection for GIs. Given the setup, the general pattern of intra-industry 
trade is straightforward; in either scenario, ROW imports the higher end of the quality range, but the 
actual range depends upon whether ROW offers a sui generis scheme or not. Even though when 
reputation needs to be established independently in each country, trade alone does not “create a 
unified world market” (Falvey 1989, p. 611), the price-quality schedule that prevails with free trade is 
identical in both countries as long as they offer the same sui generis scheme, and coincides with (7). 
Instead, when ROW does not provide IP protection for GIs, the prevailing schedule in ROW is (4).  
It follows directly that ex ante both countries have identical incentives to introduce a sui 
generis scheme, while ex post, ROW’s producer losses involve a relatively smaller set of producers, 
those established producers operating in an intermediate range of the quality spectrum (using the 
standard  technology),  while  the  home  country  alone  bears  the  losses  of  established  producers 
operating in the upper range of the quality spectrum (those producers using the GI technology). 
Finally,  we  comment  on  the  informational  role  of  country-of-origin  labels  (COOL)  in 
markets where trademarks are important quality indicators. Falvey (1989) has shown that, in a setup 
in  which  countries  are  endowed  with  different  technologies,  COOL  can  reduce  the  cost  of 
establishing reputation and can lower the price for high-quality products. Therefore in his setup, 
COOL regulations have a valuable non-protective role. In our framework, by contrast, when both 
countries have access  to the  same standard  technology, COOL  provisions  are  not sufficient  to 
provide  information  to  consumers  regarding  the  quality  of  imports  and  hence  are  not  a  viable 
substitute for a sui generis scheme. 
 
6.  The Traditional Specialities Guaranteed Scheme 
Next, we consider the traditional specialities guaranteed (TSG) scheme of the European Union. Like 
the sui generis scheme, the TSG scheme belongs to the set of the instruments used to foster product 28 
 
quality within the EU policy framework but departs from the EU’s GI scheme because of the 
absence of a link between the certified products and the geographic area of production. The aim of 
the TSG scheme is to allow high-quality products that are not necessarily linked to a geographic area 
to be differentiated from standard products.  
Specifically, the TSG scheme certifies traditional products, such as “mozzarella” or “pizza 
napoletana,”  independently  of  the  location  in  which  production  takes  place.  According  to  EU 
Regulation  509/2006,  a  traditional  product  is  produced  using  traditional  raw  materials,  has 
traditional  composition  or  is  obtained  by  a  mode  of  production  and  processing  that  reflects 
traditional methods.
30 Even though not linked to a specific area of production, traditional products 
share  many  features  with  GIs.  In  particular,  traditional  product  markets  are  also  fraught  with 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems and are typically characterized by competitive 
conditions and by the concurrent use of certification and trademarks.  
Similar to the case of product names registered under the sui generis schemes, registered TSG 
products are defined by a product specification, which includes “the key elements that define the 
product’s specific character” (EU Regulation 509/2006 Art. 6). TSG certified products are subject to 
inspection to verify compliance with the product specification. We do not explicitly model what a 
traditional ingredient or a traditional mode of production or processing is, but rather interpret the 
traditional  nature  of  these  products  as  conferring  them  a  given  minimum  quality,  and  in  what 
follows we provide a justification for why this is a reasonable assumption. 
As already discussed, we have modeled the quality/geography nexus required for a GI under 
the  sui  generis  scheme  as  an  attribute  of  the  production  technology, while  we  conceptualize  the 
conditions for traditional products as a quality requirement. There is a striking conceptual difference 
between  the  production  conditions  associated  with  a  quality/geography  nexus  and  those 
characterizing traditional products. The former are typically present in marginal or mountain areas, 
among others, where topography and climatic conditions (e.g., including exposure, humidity, daily 
temperature swings etc.) favor the attainment of a high level of quality while limiting the ability to 
cost-efficiently  provide  standard  mass-production  commodities  (e.g.,  limited  mechanization 
possibilities). Hence, we have assumed production technologies with comparative advantage over 
                                                           
30 The TSG scheme offers two types of registration of a name: with or without “reservation.” When 
a name is registered with reservation, it can only be used to label the product made in accordance 
with the specification. When the name is registered without reservation, it can be used for products 
that  do  not  correspond  to  the  specification  but  without  the  indication  “traditional  specialities 
guaranteed,” the abbreviation “TSG” or the Community symbol (EU 2009b). 29 
 
different quality ranges. To the contrary, the traditional feature of products under the TSG scheme 
has little to do with the conditions of the production environment or the technology available for 
production but is rather attributable to the use of ingredients and production procedures that favor 
the  attainment  of  specific  organoleptic  characteristics,  appearance,  consistency,  taste,  aroma, 
chemical,  microbiological  and  other  characteristics  that  are  associated  with  high  quality.  For 
example, the product specification for “pizza napoletana” defines the handling, kneading, rising and 
baking  process  (including  specific  conditions  regarding  temperature  and  duration)  that  are 
considered necessary for high-quality pizza (see the Official Journal C40, February 14, 2008). We 
conceptualize these features in a one-dimensional quality scale. 
The TSG scheme is currently under scrutiny within the European Union, and several policy 
options have been discussed, including abandonment of the scheme. A concern is that, to date, there 
is only a limited use of this scheme (only about 30 products are currently registered or have been 
published and 14 others have applied for protection). Also, it seems that the terminology and logos 
used to identified TSG-certified goods have proven to be difficult for the public to understand. 
Despite  a  widespread  support  for  the  scheme  from  stakeholders  (EU  2009b),  some  confusion 
remains on the effectiveness of the scheme as a tool for fostering the provision of quality. Our 
analysis offers a rationale for maintaining the TSG scheme and shows the potential welfare gains 
that the TSG scheme can bring about compared to the sui generis scheme.  
We  frame  the  TSG  scheme  as  a  scheme  with  no  limitation  regarding  accessibility  to 
certification  or  a  location of  production  requirement  but  with  an  MQS requirement.
31  Certified 
products under the TSG scheme are identified by a TSG logo.
32 With this scheme, the presence of a 
TSG logo informs consumers that the product meet the MQS,  0. S q  
Following the same procedure used thus far, we derive the market price-quality schedule that 
prevails with a TSG scheme. The schedule can be written as follows:  
                                                           
31  Outside  the  food  sector,  there  are  many  examples  of  certification  schemes  based  on  quality 
standards only. These include, among others, the CE mark indicating that products meet the health 
and safety requirements set out in the European Directives and the certification marks administered 
by Underwriters Laboratories for electronic devices. 
 










( ),       [ , )
( ),      [ , )       for  [ , )
( ),      
( ),       [ , )
( )        for  [ , )
( ),      
( ),       [ , )
( ),      [ , )





A q q q q
M q q q q q q q
L q q q
A q q q q
P q q q q
G q q q
A q q q q
N q q q q
G q
 Î
  Î Î 
 ³  

































  (11) 
where q and 
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and  ( ), M q  the price-quality schedule for producers who use the standard technology and certify, 
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( ) M q  and  ( ) L q  are piecewise defined because, depending on the value of  0, S q  the optimal cheating 
strategy is either producing or outsourcing the minimum quality.  
Finally, implicitly define 
m q as the quality at which  ( ) M q  and  ( ) G q  meet when the minimum 
quality standard of the TSG scheme,  0,
S q  has the same value as the GI-specific MQS (i.e.,  0 0
S G q q = ), 
  0 0 ( | ) ( | ). m G m G M q q G q q =  31 
 
Given a common value of the MQS standard across schemes (equal to  0
G q ), the TSG scheme and 
the sui generis scheme differ in two regards. First, compared to a sui generis scheme, the TSG scheme 
reduces the informational content of the certified product since it does not pin down the technology 
used in production. This expands the cheating options of producers who use the GI technology 
when the value of the MQS is such that  0 . G q q < ɶ  As an effect, when the value of the MQS is such 
that  0 , G q q < ɶ  the TSG scheme leads to higher prices for qualities 
m q q >  than the sui generis scheme. 
For the other values of the MQS, the cheating options of producers who use the GI technology are 
unaffected.
 33  
The second difference between the sui generis and the TSG schemes concerns producers’ 
access to the certification, because the TSG scheme is available to all producers independently of the 
technology used in production. The ability to certify lowers the cost of building reputation for 
producers who use the standard technology by increasing consumers’ willingness to pay for their 
new but certified brands.
34 Hence, for  0 ,
G q q < ɶ  the TSG scheme leads to lower prices for all qualities 
( , ) m q q q Î  than the sui generis scheme. For values of the MQS such that  0 ,
G q q ³ ɶ  the ability to certify 
for producers who use the standard technology is not sufficient to make them competitive with 
producers who use the GI technology. It follows that, for a common value of the MQS across the 
two systems and such that  0
G q q < ɶ, qualities in the range  ( , )
m q q q Î
 
can be supplied at a lower cost 
with the TSG scheme while quality in the range  
m q q >  can be supplied at a lower cost with the sui 
generis scheme. Hence, which scheme leads to higher aggregate surplus depends on the distribution 
of consumers  ( ). F q  
                                                           
33 For values of the MQS such that  0 , G q q < ɶ  the TSG scheme expands the cheating options of 
producers who use the GI technology, thereby decreasing consumers’ willingness to pay for new but 
certified brands by  0 0 ( ) ( ),
G G G c q c q -  and increasing the reputation-building costs for these producers. 
In contrast, when  0 , G q q ³ ɶ  the cost of producing the MQS quality is lower with the GI technology, 
0 0 ( ) ( ) G G G c q c q £ , and therefore outsourcing is not a cost-saving option for producers that use the GI 
technology. In this case, and independent of the type of certification scheme (TSG or sui generis), the 
best producers can do when cheating is to reduce quality to  0 .
G q  
 
34 Consumers’ willingness to pay increases by  0 0 ( ) ( ) G c q c q -  if  0
G q q < ɶ and by  0 0 ( ) ( ) G G c q c q -  if  0 . G q q ³ ɶ  32 
 
Finally,  we  consider  the  possibility  of  choosing  the  values  of  the  MQS,  one  for  each 
certification scheme, so as to maximize aggregate welfare and show, in appendix A4, that when it is 
possible to choose the values of the MQSs optimally, the TSG scheme yields at least the same level 
of welfare as the sui generis scheme. We also show that the TSG scheme does strictly better than the 
sui generis scheme for some populations of consumers,  ( ), F q  for which the optimized value of the 
MQS for the sui generis scheme, 
*
0 , G q  happens to be such that 
*
0 . G q q < ɶ   
The market price-quality schedule,  ( ),
M P q  is represented by the bold curve in Figure 4, 
which specifically represents the case of  0 . G q q q = < ɶ  To ease comparison, the price-quality schedule 
that would prevail with a sui generis scheme is also represented in Figure 4 by the dashed curve. 
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Figure 4. Price-Quality Schedule with a TSG scheme (Note  0
G q q = ) 
 
 














7.  Conclusions 
We contribute to the stream of literature sparked by the pioneering work of Shapiro (1983) by 
extending the theory of firm reputation to a context in which both certifications and trademarks are 
available to firms as quality indicators. We tailor our analysis to assess the role of certification and 
trademarks for food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications, whose 
markets, typically characterized by competitive conditions, are commonly fraught with asymmetric 
information and moral hazard problems. Specifically, we provide a rationale for producers of such 
goods to use certification (in addition to trademarks) when product quality could be alternatively 
sustained  through  trademarks,  a  fact  that  is  consistent  with  the  empirical  evidence  that  the 
concurrent use of certification and trademarks is common for such products. 
Several instructive aspects of the role of certification in quality provision and reputation 
formation that are applicable to many forms of certification (not just GIs) emerge from the model. 
First, we show that certification reduces the divergence between the reputation equilibrium and the 
equilibrium  that  would  prevail  under  perfect  information  by  lowering  the  cost  of  establishing 
reputation compared to a situation with only trademarks. Hence, certification improves the ability of 
reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality. Second, we show that the welfare gains 
are more likely to be larger when the introduction of a certification scheme occurs at an earlier stage 
so as to limit the potential losses in the value of already established reputations. This is because 
certification,  by  raising  the  price  that  entrants  can  command,  reduces  the  cost  of  building  a 
reputation  and  hence  the  value  of  an  established  reputation.  This  observation  also  provides  a 
rationale for industry resistance to the introduction of certification from eligible producers who have 
already committed resources towards building a reputation at the time the certification is introduced.  
With this paper we expand the existing literature on geographical indications by shifting the 
focus to explicitly consider the design of the certification scheme. This is relevant because, as our 
model reveals, the design plays an important role in mitigating the informational problems in the 
market. Moreover, we show that different designs might be optimal for different populations of 
consumers depending on the distribution of their tastes for quality. From a policy perspective, our 
model offers specific recommendations concerning the current ongoing debate and negotiations on 
geographical  indications  at  both  the  WTO  and  the  EU  levels.  With  regard  to  the  type  of  IP 
protection instrument for GIs, our model indicates that a sui generis scheme based on appellations is 
preferable to standard instruments, such as certification marks, that are currently used in many 
important markets, including the United States. We have identified a feature of certification marks 34 
 
(i.e., the fact that eligibility for registration is not conditioned upon the presence of a demonstrable 
link between the characteristics of a geographic region and the quality of the product) that limits 
their ability to convey information to consumers regarding the quality of GIs and lower the cost of 
building reputation (in this sense, certification marks are no better than trademarks). In addition, we 
show that even if the current certification mark system were to be adapted to include an initial 
screening  of  products  seeking  IP  protection  based  on  the  presence  of  a  demonstrable 
quality/geography nexus, a sui generis scheme, which combines geography and quality requirements, 
would still provide larger welfare gains than certification marks.  
Our  model  also  sheds  light  over  the  role of  the  EU’s  traditional specialities  guaranteed 
scheme in the provision of high-quality products that are not linked to a geographic area. This 
scheme, which is currently under scrutiny by the EU commission, is used to register and protect the 
names of traditional products (i.e., products that are produced using traditional raw materials, have 
traditional  composition  or  are  obtained  by  a  mode  of  production  and  processing  that  reflects 
traditional  methods).  Such  a  scheme,  based  exclusively  on  quality  (rather  than  on  geographic) 
requirements, certifies that traditional products meet given quality standards. We show that, for a 
given  common  value  of  the  MQS,  the  traditional  specialities  guaranteed  scheme  more  strongly 
reduces the cost of providing intermediate quality products compared to the sui generis scheme, while 
the sui generis scheme is better suited for reducing the cost of providing the higher end of the quality 
spectrum. Compared to the sui generis scheme, the traditional specialities guaranteed scheme has the 
advantage of extending the accessibility of certification to a larger set of producers. When it is 
feasible to optimally set the value of the MQS, this advantage leads to welfare gains compared to the 
sui generis scheme when the distribution of consumer preferences is clustered in the middle of the 
quality range. Finally, with regard to the informational role of country-of-origin labels, our model 
suggests that COOL provisions are not sufficient to provide information to consumers regarding 
the quality of imports that could lower the cost of building reputation and hence are not a viable 
substitute for a geographical indications scheme. 
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Appendix 
This appendix establishes the welfare results discussed in sections 5 and 6.  
 
Appendix A1: Proof that the reputation of established brands in the quality range 
0 Q  is lost when a 
sui generis scheme is introduced 
First, suppose that a sui generis scheme is introduced at the beginning of time  t  unexpectedly. At 
time  t , producers who have access to the GI technology can invest in reputation (i.e., produce a 
quality  0
G q q ³  and sell it below production costs). At time  1, t +  reputation,  , R q =  is established 
and, from time  1 t+  on, the new equilibrium schedule  ( ) G P q  prevails in the market. Anticipating the 
new equilibrium schedule, a producer of quality 
0 q Q Î  with an established brand will be better off 
deviating at time  t  (i.e., producing the minimum quality) than maintaining the same quality from 
time t   on if  
 
1
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). G
r c q P q c q c q   - + - < -    
As can be readily verified, the above inequality can be rewritten as  ( ) ( ), G P q A q <  where 
( )
G P q  and  ( ) A q  are given by (7) and (2) respectively. Over the range in which  ( )
G P q  is defined, 
( ) ( )
G P q A q <  always holds. It follows that producers are better off by deviating at time  t . This is 
also  true  for  those  producers  operating  in  the  quality  range  where  ( )
G P q   is  not  defined  (the 
discontinuity range), since the price at which they would be able to sell their products at time  1 t+  is 
strictly less then  ( ) A q  (consumers can find higher qualities at prices  ( ) A q ). Knowing that it is 
optimal for these producers to cheat, consumers will not be willing to pay more than  0 ( ) c q  for these 
brands at time  t . It follows that established brands in the quality range 
0 Q completely lose their 
reputation as soon as the sui generis scheme is introduced. Finally, if these producers have access to 
the GI technology (i.e., if they can relocate to a GI region) or can sell their trademarks to a producer 
with access to the GI technology, then the loss of reputation might be partial.  
In the alternative case in which the introduction of a GI scheme at time t  is announced and 
expected by both producers and consumers at time  1, t -  producers would immediately cheat and 
lose their reputation at time  1 t- . Consumers would correctly predict this behavior and would be 
willing  to  pay  at  most  0 ( ) c q   in  1 t- .  Finally,  in  the  alternative  case  where  in  time  1 t-   only 36 
 
producers anticipate the introduction of a sui generis scheme (but consumers are unaware), producers 
immediately cheat. Consumers,  being  unable  to anticipate producers’  behavior, are  surprised by 
lower-than-expected qualities while producers recoup their original investments in reputation. 
 
Appendix A2: Proof that the reputation of established brands of quality  0
G q q ³  produced with the 
GI-technology is partially lost when a sui generis scheme is introduced 
When a sui generis scheme is introduced, producers of established brands who use the GI-technology 
have the following options: (i) maintain the same quality  q without certifying; (ii) cut the quality to 
0; q  (iii) maintain the same quality q and certify; (iv) cut the quality to  0
G q  and certify.  
Conditional on not certifying, producers are better off by cutting their quality to  0, q  because 
their credibility constraint, 
 
1
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), G G
r c q G q c q c q   - + - ³ -    
does not hold for any value of  . q q ³ ɶ  Observing the absence of certification, consumers correctly 
anticipate  that  producers  have  cut  their  quality  to  0. q   Hence,  conditional  on  not  certifying, 
producers lose their reputation immediately and their future profits, discounted to time  , t  are equal 
to zero. Conditional on certifying, the credibility constraint is 
 
1
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . G G G G
r c q G q c q c q w w w   - - + - - ³ - -    
Because,  conditional  on  certifying,  the  credibility  constraint  holds  (with  equality)  for  all  , q q ³ ɶ  
maintaining  the  same  quality  is  a  best  response  for  producers.  Observing  the  presence  of 
certification, consumers correctly anticipate that maintaining quality is optimal for producers and, in 
this case, producers’ future profits, discounted to time  , t  are equal to  
 
1
0 0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , G G G G G G
r N q c q G q c q r c q c q c q c q w w w       - - + - - = + - - + -        
By (6), these discounted profits are strictly positive for any  { } 0 max , . G q q q ³ ɶ  We can conclude that, 
for producers of established brands of quality  { } 0 max , G q q q ³ ɶ  who use the GI-technology, the best 
response to the introduction of a sui generis scheme is to maintain and certify the same quality.  37 
 
Finally, the future profits, discounted to time  , t  that producers would earn if no sui generis 
scheme  were  to  be  introduced  are  equal  to  0 (1 ) ( ) ( ) . G r c q c q   + -     Hence,  since  for  any 
{ } 0 max , G q q q ³ ɶ  
 
0 0 0 0 (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , G G G G G r c q c q r c q c q c q c q w       + - > + - - + -        
the  value  of  reputation  is  partially  lost  when  the  sui  generis  scheme  is  introduced.  Finally,  for 
producers with quality  0
G q q q £ < ɶ  the loss of reputation is complete because these producers do not 
have the option to maintain the same quality and certify. 
 
Appendix A3: Consumer Selection of Qualities and the Optimal Value of the MQS for a sui generis 
Scheme 
If a sui generis scheme were to be introduced before any investment in reputation has taken place, 
what should the value of  0
G q  be in order to maximize welfare? From an ex ante perspective, the 
optimal value of  0
G q  maximizes aggregate consumer surplus. Based on our assumptions regarding 
consumer preferences, consumers can be divided into different groups depending on the product 
they  opt  to  purchase:  nonpurchasers  ( ) 0 0 q q £ < ;  those  who  purchase  standard  product  of 
minimum quality  ( ) 0 1 q q q £ < ; those who purchase standard product of quality in excess of the 
minimum  0 q q > ( ) 1 2 q q q £ < ; those who purchase non-certified product from the GI region(s) 
( ) 2 3 q q q £ < ; those who purchase GI-certified product of quality  0
G q  ( ) 3 4 q q q £ < ; and those who 
purchase GI-certified product of quality  0
G q q >  ( ) 4 . q q q £ <  Depending on the value of  0
G q  one or 
more of these groups could be empty. Whereas the specific value of  0
G q  that maximizes aggregate 
consumer  surplus  depends  on  the  specific  distribution  of  consumer  types,  ( ), F q   the  following 
considerations apply for all possible  ( ). F q  First, we note that the effect on welfare of the specific 
value of the GI-specific MQS,  0 ,
G q  occurs through its effect on the position of the equilibrium 
market price-quality schedule. Second, we argue that no value of  0
G q  such that  0 ,
G q q q   Î  can be 
optimal. Suppose, in contradiction, that  0 ,
G q q q   Î . A small increase in the value of  0
G q  from its 38 
 
initial value shifts down  ( ) G q  while leaving  ( ) A q  unaffected. The downward shift in  ( ) G q  increases 
the surplus of those consumers who purchase the GI-certified product, the price of which has 
decreased.  When  0 ,
G q q q   Î ,  at  most  four  groups  of  consumers  exist:  (1)  nonpurchasers,  (2) 
purchasers of  0 q , (3) purchasers of standard product of quality in excess of the minimum, and (4) 
purchasers of GI-certified product of quality  0 . G q q >  Hence, 2 3 4. q q q = =  
Moreover, because no consumer’s purchase is constrained by  0 , G q  a small increase in the 
value of  0
G q  does not reduce the surplus of other consumers. Without costs for raising the quality 
standard, but with benefits due to the lower prices of the GI-certified product, welfare can be 
increased by raising the value of  0
G q  to  . q  A small increase in  0
G q  also causes substitution by the 
marginal consumers that are indifferent between buying standard and GI-certified product, with no 
first-order  effect  on  welfare.  Moreover,  given  that  consumer  indifference  curves  are  smooth, 
additional gains in welfare can be achieved by marginal successive increases of the value of  0
G q  
above q until the quality choice of some consumers becomes constrained by the value of  0 . G q  Once 
0
G q  has reached such value, call it  , q e +  a new group of consumers is formed, ( ) 3 4 . q q q £ <   q e +  
is defined as the smallest value of  0
G q  such that at least one consumer type,  3, q  buys quality  0 . G q
These consumers buy quality  0
G q . Any additional increase in the value of  0
G q  above  q e +  involves 
welfare losses to this new group of consumers whose purchases are constrained by the value of  0
G q .  
We conclude that the welfare-maximizing value of  0
G q  has to balance the welfare losses of these 
consumers and the welfare gains to consumers who purchase the GI-certified product and therefore 
belongs in the range between  q e +  and the value at which all consumers who purchase GI-certified 
product are constrained by the value of the GI-specific MQS. Finally, note that depending on  ( ), F q  
the optimal value of the MQS could be above  . q  When this is the case, there might exist a group of 
consumers that purchase non-certified product produced with the GI technology ( ) 2 3 q q q £ < . 
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Appendix A4: Proof that the TSG scheme (i) is at least as good as the sui generis scheme and (ii) can 
be strictly better than the sui generis scheme in terms of aggregate welfare 
Suppose that it is possible to choose values of the MQS for the sui generis scheme,  0 ,
G q  and for the 
TSG  scheme,  0, S q   that  maximize  aggregate  welfare.  Suppose  that  for  a  given  distribution  of 
consumer types,  ( ), F q  the optimal value of  0
G q  happens to be 
*
0 . G q q ³ ɶ  When this is the case, the 
TSG scheme is at least as good as the sui generis scheme because it is always possible to set the value 
of  0
S q  in such a way that the resulting price-quality schedule coincides with the schedule under the 
sui  generis scheme (by  setting  0
S q equal to 
*
0
G q ).  Suppose  instead  that  for a  given distribution  of 
consumer types, the optimal value of  0
G q  happens to be 
*
0 . G q q < ɶ  When this is the case, it is also 
possible to find a value of 
*
0 0
S G q q >  such that  ( ) ( )
*
0 0 . G G S c q c q =
 
Denote this value  0 ˆ .
S q  For such a 
pair of values, 
*
0
G q  and   0 ˆ ,
S q  the price-quality schedule that prevails with the sui generis scheme,  ( ), G q  
and the price-quality schedule that prevails with the TSG scheme,  ( ), L q  overlap in the quality range 
0 ˆ . S q q ³  Also, on the other side of the quality spectrum, in the range  *
0 , G q q <  the relevant price-
quality schedules of the two schemes coincide and are equal to  ( ). A q  Only the sui generis scheme 
provides the intermediate quality range,  )
*
0 0 ˆ , . G S q q 
  This range is provided at a price  ( ), G q  which is 
strictly increasing in  . q  Specifically, the price for the minimum quality in this range,  *
0 , G q  is  ( )
*
0 . G G q  
Because by construction  ( ) ( )
*
0 0 ˆ , S G M q G q =  at the price  ( )
*
0
G G q  the TSG scheme provides quality 
0 ˆ , S q  which is the supremum of the quality range  )
*
0 0 ˆ , . G S q q 
  Hence, as long as there is at least one 
consumer who would purchase a quality in the range  )
*
0 0 ˆ , G S q q 
  when the sui generis scheme is in 
place, the TSG scheme is strictly better than the sui generis scheme in terms of aggregate welfare, 
because this consumer can purchase a higher quality at a lower (or at the same) price.   40 
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